{"id":804321,"date":"2026-11-20T11:34:32","date_gmt":"2026-11-20T16:34:32","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/spaceweekly.com\/?p=804321"},"modified":"2026-11-20T11:34:32","modified_gmt":"2026-11-20T16:34:32","slug":"jpl-at-90-whose-lab-is-it","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/spaceweekly.com\/?p=804321","title":{"rendered":"JPL at 90: Whose lab is it?"},"content":{"rendered":"<p> <br \/>\n<\/p>\n<div>\n<p><strong>Casey Dreier:<\/strong> This is the crux of JPL\u2019s ongoing identity tensions. When JPL becomes part of NASA, it\u2019s not a NASA center in the way the others are. It\u2019s not federally run; it\u2019s its own thing. Why is JPL unique in that context, and what class of institution is it? It\u2019s not unique in government, but it\u2019s unique within NASA.<\/p>\n<p><strong>Peter Westwick:<\/strong> There are many others. At one point they were called GOCOs \u2014 government-owned, contractor-operated \u2014 and later FFRDCs. There are examples especially in the national laboratory system, which was originally under the Atomic Energy Commission and then under the Department of Energy when it was formed in the 1970s. The labs at Los Alamos, Livermore, Berkeley, Oak Ridge, Brookhaven, and Argonne are operated by contractors and not owned by the federal government.<\/p>\n<p>NASA is a little bit different in that it inherited a network of laboratories, which it called centers, from the NACA, which goes back to World War I and work on airplanes. NASA takes over all of these NACA centers, but it also wants JPL\u2019s capabilities. JPL is working on rockets, and it has developed a bunch of skills in guidance and control and especially radio telemetry for its rockets. NASA basically takes JPL away from the Army and says, \u201cYour skills in telemetry especially will apply to what we want to do with automated spacecraft, which we\u2019re going to have to be able to communicate with, guide, and control. JPL, you\u2019re the best ones to take that job.\u201d<\/p>\n<p>At that point, rocket research was basically being handed off to industry, and NASA already had other places working on rockets. So JPL could say, \u201cThe rocket work might be fizzling out, so to speak, but spacecraft look like the job of the future, so let\u2019s do it.\u201d JPL and Caltech were amenable, and NASA took JPL off the Army\u2019s hands wholesale.<\/p>\n<p><strong>Casey Dreier:<\/strong> So NASA pays Caltech an annual management fee, Caltech runs JPL for NASA, and all the hardware there is paid for by NASA. JPL has an allegiance to both Caltech and the space agency, and JPL is also its own thing in a way that other NASA centers aren\u2019t.<\/p>\n<p><strong>Peter Westwick:<\/strong> Right. And this is a really difficult relationship because it\u2019s a three-body problem, as they say, or a triangle: JPL at one vertex, then Caltech, then NASA. JPL is the only NASA center that\u2019s operated under contract, with Caltech. It goes back to JPL always being a Caltech project, starting with the rocket research in the 1930s. It grew and grew, they maintained Caltech\u2019s oversight as it grew, and when NASA took it over, Caltech came along as the administrator.<\/p>\n<p>All JPL staff are Caltech employees; their paychecks come from Caltech. The idea is that this helps with recruiting and retaining staff, because Caltech is your employer. Caltech definitely has some cachet as one of the leading engineering institutions in the world, and the contract provides a kind of elitism by association. The contract also provides a measure of independence from NASA. In theory, it allows JPL to do things without NASA bureaucrats looking over its shoulder all the time.<\/p>\n<p>There\u2019s a geographic component, too: JPL is about as far from Washington, D.C., as you can get in the continental United States. So there is administrative distance and geographic distance, and that allows JPL to be more innovative. The Caltech environment, of course, also encourages innovation. In return, NASA pays Caltech a management fee plus some overhead to cover administrative expenses. That relationship has continued to this day, but with occasional struggles, tensions, and questions from basically every side.<\/p>\n<p><strong>Casey Dreier:<\/strong> You note a question that\u2019s frequently asked: Is it NASA\u2019s JPL or Caltech\u2019s JPL? Whose JPL is it?<\/p>\n<p><strong>Peter Westwick:<\/strong> Both institutions, I think, would answer that it\u2019s theirs. NASA says it\u2019s ours, and Caltech says, \u201cNo, it\u2019s ours. That\u2019s why you\u2019re paying us every year. Why are you paying us if it\u2019s not ours?\u201d Caltech has been the only contractor since the lab\u2019s founding, going back to World War II and before that to the 1930s, but that is now being questioned.<\/p>\n<p>There\u2019s also another issue: JPL eventually grows to be far bigger than Caltech itself. Caltech has always prided itself on remaining really small and really elite, with the idea that it can be more nimble and not get bogged down with big stuff. The problem, from the view of the Caltech faculty, is that it becomes the tail wagging the dog. Maybe the metaphor isn\u2019t quite right, but JPL is far bigger than Caltech, and Caltech is the administrator for it.<\/p>\n<p><strong>Casey Dreier:<\/strong> There are more JPL staff than Caltech staff.<\/p>\n<p><strong>Peter Westwick:<\/strong> Far more. It varies depending on when you look, but say 4,000 to 6,000 staff, which is much, much bigger than Caltech.<\/p>\n<p><strong>Casey Dreier:<\/strong> And at times, the operating fee Caltech received was roughly one-fifth of what it was taking in from tuition or operating funds.<\/p>\n<p><strong>Peter Westwick:<\/strong> The accounting gets fuzzy, depending on what period you\u2019re looking at, but from the 1970s through the 1990s at least, if you add the management fee together with the overhead Caltech got from NASA, it was about 15% of the campus budget, which is substantial. So when some Caltech faculty said, \u201cHang on a second, why are we running this giant laboratory off campus?\u201d the Caltech administrators would say, \u201cIf we get rid of it, where are we going to find that 15% of our annual budget?\u201d It was basically the equivalent of $100,000 per professor. So the administration would go back to the faculty and say, \u201cDo you each want to take a $100,000 haircut? No? OK, then please be quiet, and we will proceed with the status quo.\u201d<\/p>\n<p><strong>Casey Dreier:<\/strong> You talked about some of the stated advantages of an FFRDC: being more nimble, being able to attract talent because of the association with Caltech, being less bureaucratic. When you were studying this, did you see examples of this in practice that made JPL distinct from other NASA centers?<\/p>\n<p><strong>Peter Westwick:<\/strong> One other advantage Caltech provides is a world-class faculty, especially in science and engineering. For its entire history, JPL has drawn on Caltech students and faculty for its programs, going back to the graduate students who first worked on rockets for the Army. You see this especially in the project scientists on JPL missions. Bruce Murray was head of the camera team on several of the Mariner projects in the \u201960s and early \u201970s and then became the director of JPL. Ed Stone, a Caltech professor, was lead scientist on the Voyager mission \u2014 maybe the greatest mission in the history of JPL. You can multiply these examples several times over. Caltech faculty have regularly engaged as scientists on JPL missions, and Caltech graduate students and postdocs also work on JPL projects.<\/p>\n<p>The proximity helps, too. JPL was located at some distance from the Caltech campus after those early rocket experiments blew up, but it\u2019s still maybe a 15-minute drive from campus, depending on traffic. It\u2019s entirely reasonable for faculty to pop up to the lab during the day, collaborate with JPL engineers and scientists, and get back down to campus. That collaborative aspect is another argument for Caltech having this contract.<\/p>\n<p><strong>Casey Dreier:<\/strong> Your book covers 1976 to 2004, but let\u2019s skip quickly through the \u201960s. JPL starts making lunar missions, struggles with Ranger, and ultimately figures out systems engineering. It makes the Mariner missions to Venus, Mars, and ultimately Mercury, and maybe caps it with Viking, making the orbiters and helping with the landing. It seems like that\u2019s really when JPL\u2019s identity as a planetary center coalesced.<\/p>\n<p><strong>Peter Westwick:<\/strong> Yes. JPL had been working on rockets for the Army, and there was pressure to produce. We\u2019re in the Cold War with the Soviet Union, and the Army says, \u201cWe really need these rockets.\u201d JPL got in the habit of going out to White Sands Missile Range, firing a rocket off, and seeing what happens: \u201cWe\u2019ll test these rockets until they succeed, and then we\u2019ll test them a little bit more.\u201d But when you transition to NASA and build spacecraft that you\u2019re sending into outer space, you can\u2019t just test-fire them until they work. You\u2019ve got one chance to get it right. If that spacecraft fails, you can\u2019t bring it back into the shop, repair it, and launch it again.<\/p>\n<p>JPL learns this basically right off the bat with some of the Ranger spacecraft to the Moon. They experience some failures and learn the hard way that the nation will not tolerate failures of these very expensive spacecraft. They\u2019re very expensive, and it\u2019s very embarrassing when they fail. JPL gets raked over the coals in Congress and by NASA, and they develop discipline in both senses of the word: discipline in the sense of an engineering field, and discipline in the sense of rigor. That\u2019s systems engineering \u2014 basically a regime to produce technological systems beyond the outer edges of current possibility that won\u2019t fail the first time you launch them.<\/p>\n<p>This regime of systems engineering really becomes the lab\u2019s identity. It produces a culture of ruthless attention to detail, with legendary design review boards where an engineer presenting plans for a particular component of the spacecraft gets grilled and reduced to a quivering puddle, even very seasoned engineers. It also produces an incredible work ethic: If there\u2019s a launch window coming up, you do the work, whatever it takes. If that means 80-hour or 100-hour workweeks, so be it. Some of the commitment is also because you\u2019re inspired by the fact that you are building a spacecraft that is going to land on the Moon, orbit Mars, or visit all of the outer planets. So the transition to NASA brings in this new kind of culture, forged through these early failures. That becomes the lab\u2019s identity, and its success is basically built on this discipline.<\/p>\n<p><strong>Casey Dreier:<\/strong> Then in the mid-1970s, the resources the lab had gotten used to suddenly appeared to dry up. Bruce Murray referred to it as \u201cthe bathtub.\u201d The planetary program started pulling back, there wasn\u2019t a lot of work coming down the line, and JPL suddenly had to figure out what to do.<\/p>\n<p><strong>Peter Westwick:<\/strong> Right, and NASA is reprioritizing. It\u2019s ironic, because it\u2019s the moment of greatest triumph for JPL, with the Voyager encounters at Jupiter and Saturn returning spectacular images and all this data showing how diverse the outer Solar System is. At the very same time, NASA is threatening to drastically cut JPL\u2019s budget and cancel the follow-on missions to Voyager, to the point where some people are seriously discussing whether JPL is, I think the quote is, \u201csurplus to our needs,\u201d and maybe we can just close it down.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n<p><br \/>\n<br \/><a href=\"https:\/\/www.planetary.org\/articles\/jpl-at-90-whose-lab-is-it?rand=772267\">Source link <\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Casey Dreier: This is the crux of JPL\u2019s ongoing identity tensions. When JPL becomes part of NASA, it\u2019s not a NASA center in the way the others are. It\u2019s not&hellip; <\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":804322,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[45],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-804321","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-planetary-society"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/spaceweekly.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/804321","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/spaceweekly.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/spaceweekly.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/spaceweekly.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/spaceweekly.com\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcomments&post=804321"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/spaceweekly.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/804321\/revisions"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/spaceweekly.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/media\/804322"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/spaceweekly.com\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fmedia&parent=804321"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/spaceweekly.com\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcategories&post=804321"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/spaceweekly.com\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Ftags&post=804321"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}