Casey Dreier: This is the crux of JPL’s ongoing identity tensions. When JPL becomes part of NASA, it’s not a NASA center in the way the others are. It’s not federally run; it’s its own thing. Why is JPL unique in that context, and what class of institution is it? It’s not unique in government, but it’s unique within NASA.
Peter Westwick: There are many others. At one point they were called GOCOs — government-owned, contractor-operated — and later FFRDCs. There are examples especially in the national laboratory system, which was originally under the Atomic Energy Commission and then under the Department of Energy when it was formed in the 1970s. The labs at Los Alamos, Livermore, Berkeley, Oak Ridge, Brookhaven, and Argonne are operated by contractors and not owned by the federal government.
NASA is a little bit different in that it inherited a network of laboratories, which it called centers, from the NACA, which goes back to World War I and work on airplanes. NASA takes over all of these NACA centers, but it also wants JPL’s capabilities. JPL is working on rockets, and it has developed a bunch of skills in guidance and control and especially radio telemetry for its rockets. NASA basically takes JPL away from the Army and says, “Your skills in telemetry especially will apply to what we want to do with automated spacecraft, which we’re going to have to be able to communicate with, guide, and control. JPL, you’re the best ones to take that job.”
At that point, rocket research was basically being handed off to industry, and NASA already had other places working on rockets. So JPL could say, “The rocket work might be fizzling out, so to speak, but spacecraft look like the job of the future, so let’s do it.” JPL and Caltech were amenable, and NASA took JPL off the Army’s hands wholesale.
Casey Dreier: So NASA pays Caltech an annual management fee, Caltech runs JPL for NASA, and all the hardware there is paid for by NASA. JPL has an allegiance to both Caltech and the space agency, and JPL is also its own thing in a way that other NASA centers aren’t.
Peter Westwick: Right. And this is a really difficult relationship because it’s a three-body problem, as they say, or a triangle: JPL at one vertex, then Caltech, then NASA. JPL is the only NASA center that’s operated under contract, with Caltech. It goes back to JPL always being a Caltech project, starting with the rocket research in the 1930s. It grew and grew, they maintained Caltech’s oversight as it grew, and when NASA took it over, Caltech came along as the administrator.
All JPL staff are Caltech employees; their paychecks come from Caltech. The idea is that this helps with recruiting and retaining staff, because Caltech is your employer. Caltech definitely has some cachet as one of the leading engineering institutions in the world, and the contract provides a kind of elitism by association. The contract also provides a measure of independence from NASA. In theory, it allows JPL to do things without NASA bureaucrats looking over its shoulder all the time.
There’s a geographic component, too: JPL is about as far from Washington, D.C., as you can get in the continental United States. So there is administrative distance and geographic distance, and that allows JPL to be more innovative. The Caltech environment, of course, also encourages innovation. In return, NASA pays Caltech a management fee plus some overhead to cover administrative expenses. That relationship has continued to this day, but with occasional struggles, tensions, and questions from basically every side.
Casey Dreier: You note a question that’s frequently asked: Is it NASA’s JPL or Caltech’s JPL? Whose JPL is it?
Peter Westwick: Both institutions, I think, would answer that it’s theirs. NASA says it’s ours, and Caltech says, “No, it’s ours. That’s why you’re paying us every year. Why are you paying us if it’s not ours?” Caltech has been the only contractor since the lab’s founding, going back to World War II and before that to the 1930s, but that is now being questioned.
There’s also another issue: JPL eventually grows to be far bigger than Caltech itself. Caltech has always prided itself on remaining really small and really elite, with the idea that it can be more nimble and not get bogged down with big stuff. The problem, from the view of the Caltech faculty, is that it becomes the tail wagging the dog. Maybe the metaphor isn’t quite right, but JPL is far bigger than Caltech, and Caltech is the administrator for it.
Casey Dreier: There are more JPL staff than Caltech staff.
Peter Westwick: Far more. It varies depending on when you look, but say 4,000 to 6,000 staff, which is much, much bigger than Caltech.
Casey Dreier: And at times, the operating fee Caltech received was roughly one-fifth of what it was taking in from tuition or operating funds.
Peter Westwick: The accounting gets fuzzy, depending on what period you’re looking at, but from the 1970s through the 1990s at least, if you add the management fee together with the overhead Caltech got from NASA, it was about 15% of the campus budget, which is substantial. So when some Caltech faculty said, “Hang on a second, why are we running this giant laboratory off campus?” the Caltech administrators would say, “If we get rid of it, where are we going to find that 15% of our annual budget?” It was basically the equivalent of $100,000 per professor. So the administration would go back to the faculty and say, “Do you each want to take a $100,000 haircut? No? OK, then please be quiet, and we will proceed with the status quo.”
Casey Dreier: You talked about some of the stated advantages of an FFRDC: being more nimble, being able to attract talent because of the association with Caltech, being less bureaucratic. When you were studying this, did you see examples of this in practice that made JPL distinct from other NASA centers?
Peter Westwick: One other advantage Caltech provides is a world-class faculty, especially in science and engineering. For its entire history, JPL has drawn on Caltech students and faculty for its programs, going back to the graduate students who first worked on rockets for the Army. You see this especially in the project scientists on JPL missions. Bruce Murray was head of the camera team on several of the Mariner projects in the ’60s and early ’70s and then became the director of JPL. Ed Stone, a Caltech professor, was lead scientist on the Voyager mission — maybe the greatest mission in the history of JPL. You can multiply these examples several times over. Caltech faculty have regularly engaged as scientists on JPL missions, and Caltech graduate students and postdocs also work on JPL projects.
The proximity helps, too. JPL was located at some distance from the Caltech campus after those early rocket experiments blew up, but it’s still maybe a 15-minute drive from campus, depending on traffic. It’s entirely reasonable for faculty to pop up to the lab during the day, collaborate with JPL engineers and scientists, and get back down to campus. That collaborative aspect is another argument for Caltech having this contract.
Casey Dreier: Your book covers 1976 to 2004, but let’s skip quickly through the ’60s. JPL starts making lunar missions, struggles with Ranger, and ultimately figures out systems engineering. It makes the Mariner missions to Venus, Mars, and ultimately Mercury, and maybe caps it with Viking, making the orbiters and helping with the landing. It seems like that’s really when JPL’s identity as a planetary center coalesced.
Peter Westwick: Yes. JPL had been working on rockets for the Army, and there was pressure to produce. We’re in the Cold War with the Soviet Union, and the Army says, “We really need these rockets.” JPL got in the habit of going out to White Sands Missile Range, firing a rocket off, and seeing what happens: “We’ll test these rockets until they succeed, and then we’ll test them a little bit more.” But when you transition to NASA and build spacecraft that you’re sending into outer space, you can’t just test-fire them until they work. You’ve got one chance to get it right. If that spacecraft fails, you can’t bring it back into the shop, repair it, and launch it again.
JPL learns this basically right off the bat with some of the Ranger spacecraft to the Moon. They experience some failures and learn the hard way that the nation will not tolerate failures of these very expensive spacecraft. They’re very expensive, and it’s very embarrassing when they fail. JPL gets raked over the coals in Congress and by NASA, and they develop discipline in both senses of the word: discipline in the sense of an engineering field, and discipline in the sense of rigor. That’s systems engineering — basically a regime to produce technological systems beyond the outer edges of current possibility that won’t fail the first time you launch them.
This regime of systems engineering really becomes the lab’s identity. It produces a culture of ruthless attention to detail, with legendary design review boards where an engineer presenting plans for a particular component of the spacecraft gets grilled and reduced to a quivering puddle, even very seasoned engineers. It also produces an incredible work ethic: If there’s a launch window coming up, you do the work, whatever it takes. If that means 80-hour or 100-hour workweeks, so be it. Some of the commitment is also because you’re inspired by the fact that you are building a spacecraft that is going to land on the Moon, orbit Mars, or visit all of the outer planets. So the transition to NASA brings in this new kind of culture, forged through these early failures. That becomes the lab’s identity, and its success is basically built on this discipline.
Casey Dreier: Then in the mid-1970s, the resources the lab had gotten used to suddenly appeared to dry up. Bruce Murray referred to it as “the bathtub.” The planetary program started pulling back, there wasn’t a lot of work coming down the line, and JPL suddenly had to figure out what to do.
Peter Westwick: Right, and NASA is reprioritizing. It’s ironic, because it’s the moment of greatest triumph for JPL, with the Voyager encounters at Jupiter and Saturn returning spectacular images and all this data showing how diverse the outer Solar System is. At the very same time, NASA is threatening to drastically cut JPL’s budget and cancel the follow-on missions to Voyager, to the point where some people are seriously discussing whether JPL is, I think the quote is, “surplus to our needs,” and maybe we can just close it down.